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Price discovery and liquidity in financial markets arise from the interactions of
different investors with different information and trading motives using a variety of
order execution strategies.2 An important insight from Akerlof (1970), Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980), Kyle (1985), and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) is that trading
noise plays a critical role in markets subject to adverse selection when some investors
trade on superior private information. However, orders from investors with non-
informational reasons to trade — index funds, passive pension and insurance portfo-
lios — also presumably reflect optimizing behavior such as minimizing trading costs,
optimizing hedging, and other portfolio structuring objectives. In addition, large pas-
sive investors routinely use optimized order execution algorithms to trade dynamically
in current markets (see, e.g., Johnson 2010).
Our paper is the first to model a market equilibrium with dynamic trading by both
informed and rebalancing investors without exogenous restrictions on information life.
We specifically investigate a multi-period Kyle (1985) market in which there are two
strategic investors with different trading motives who each follow optimal but differ-
ent dynamic trading strategies. One investor is a standard Kyle strategic informed
investor with long-lived information. The other investor is a strategic portfolio re-
balancer who trades over multiple rounds to minimize the cost of hitting a terminal
trading target. In addition, the model has noise traders and competitive market mak-
ers. In our model, the informed investor’s orders are masked by two types of trading
noise over time: Independently and identically distributed noise trader orders and
autocorrelated randomness in the rebalancer’s optimally chosen orders.
Our main results are:
• Sufficient conditions for a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium are characterized.
• An algorithm for computing such equilibria numerically is provided.
• The presence of the rebalancer introduces several new features: i) the aggregate
order flow is autocorrelated, ii) expected trading volume for the insider and
rebalancer is U -shaped over time, and iii) the price impact of the order flow is
S-shaped with initial price impacts above those in Kyle and later price impacts
below Kyle’s.
2 The heterogeneity of the investing public is an important fact underlying current debates about
high frequency trading (SEC 2010).
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• The rebalancer’s and insider’s orders tend to become negatively correlated over
time. As a result, their orders partially offset each other so that, on average,
they provide liquidity to each other symbiotically with a reduced price impact.
Our analysis integrates two literatures on pricing and trading. The first literature
is research on price discovery. Kyle (1985) described equilibrium pricing and dynamic
trading in a market with noise traders and a single investor who has long-lived private
information. Subsequent work by Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster and
Viswanathan (1996), and Back, Cao, and Willard (2000) extended the model to allow
for multiple informed investors with long-lived information.
A second literature studies optimal dynamic order execution for uninformed in-
vestors with trading targets. This work includes Bertsimas and Lo (1998), Almgren
and Chriss (1999, 2000), Gatheral and Scheid (2011), Engel, Ferstenberg, and Russell
(2012) and Predoiu, Shaikhet, and Shreve (2011) as well as Bunnermeier and Peder-
sen (2005) on predatory trading in response to predictable uninformed trading. This
research all takes the price impact function for orders as an exogenously specified
model input. In contrast, we model optimal order execution in an equilibrium setting
that endogenizes the price impact of orders and that reflects, in particular, the impact
of strategic uninformed trading on price impacts.3 Keim and Madhavan (1995) give
empirical evidence on dynamic order-splitting by institutional investors.
Models combining both informed trading and optimized uninformed rebalancing
have largely been restricted to static settings or to multi-period settings with short-
lived information and/or exogenous restrictions on the rebalancer’s trading strategies.
Admati and Pfleider (1988) study a dynamic market consisting of a series of repeating
one-period trading rounds with short-lived information and uninformed discretionary
liquidity traders who only trade once but decide when to time their trading. An
exception is Seppi (1990) who models an informed investor and a strategic uninformed
investor with a trading target in a market in which both can trade dynamically.
His model is solved for separating and partial pooling equilibria with upstairs block
trading, but only for a restricted set of particular model parameterizations.
Our paper is related to Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (DJK 2014). Both papers
model dynamic order splitting by an uninformed investor in a multi-period market.
3In our model, order flow has a price impact due to adverse selection because of the insider’s pri-
vate information. Alternatively, one could model price impacts due to inventory costs and imperfect
competition in liquidity provision.
2
Consequently, both models have autocorrelated (predictable) order flows because of
the dynamic rebalancing. Order flow autocorrelation is empirically significant but
absent in previous Kyle models.4 However, there are two differences between our
model and DJK (2014). First, the informed investors in DJK (2014) have short-lived
private information — i.e., they only have one chance to trade on high-frequency
value innovations before they become public — whereas our insider trades on long-
lived information over multiple intra-day time periods. Consequently, it is harder in
our model to distinguish sequences of informed orders from sequences of uninformed
orders. Second, our rebalancer’s orders depend dynamically on the realized path
of aggregate orders as well as on his rebalancing target, whereas the DJK (2014)
rebalancer trades deterministically over time given his target. In particular, our
rebalancer learns about the insider’s information, since he can filter aggregate order
flow better than the market makers. He then exploits this information in his trading.
Our analysis is possible because we use the approach of Foster and Vishwanathan
(1996) to circumvent the large state space problem mentioned in DJK (2014).
”Sunshine trading” is a prominent feature of models on uninformed rebalancing.
One version of sunshine trading exploits dynamic fluctuation in the price impacts of
orders as the supply of liquidity is temporarily depleted and then replenished over
time (see Predoiu, Shaikhet, and Shreve 2011). Another version involves predictabil-
ity in the timing of uninformed trading (see Admati and Pfleiderer 1988). Yet another
version, new in DJK (2014) and our model, is that predictable order flow has no incre-
mental information content and thus, absent frictions in the supply of liquidity, has
no price impact. Thus, the rebalancer can use early trading to signal later trading.
However, the numerical importance of sunshine trading is not large in our model.
This is because, unlike in DJK (2014), our insider trades dynamically. Other interac-
tions with the insider, however, can reduce the rebalancer’s trading costs at various
times. These interactions include dynamic learning effects and also symbiotic liq-
uidity provision when the insider’s and rebalancer’s orders are negatively correlated.
The symbiotic liquidity provision is a new theoretical property of our model. Simply
looking at the rebalancer’s problem in a partial equilibrium analysis might cause one
to miss these equilibrium considerations.
4For empirical evidence on order flow autocorrelation, see Hasbrouck (1991a,b) and also related
empirical references in Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2014).
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1 Model
We model a multi-period discrete-time market for a risky stock. A trading day is
normalized to the interval [0, 1] during which there are N ∈ N time points at which
trade can occur where ∆ := 1
N
> 0 is the time step. As in Kyle (1985), the stock’s
true value v˜ becomes publicly known at time N +1 after the market closes at the end
of the day. The value v˜ is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2v˜ > 0.
Additionally, there is a money market account that pays a zero interest rate.
Four types of investors trade in our model:
1. An informed trader (who we call the insider) knows the true stock value v˜ at
the beginning of trading and has zero initial positions in both the stock and the
money market account. The insider is risk-neutral and maximizes the expected
value of her final wealth. The insider’s order for the stock at time n, n = 1, ..., N ,
is denoted by ∆θIn where θ
I
n is her accumulated total stock position at time n.
2. A constrained investor (who we call the rebalancer) needs to rebalance his port-
folio by buying or selling stock to reach a terminal trading target constraint a˜
on his ending stock position θRN by the end of the trading day. For example,
he might be the portfolio manager for a large index fund or a passive pension
plan or an insurance company who needs to rebalance his portfolio. In practice,
such investors trade dynamically using optimal order execution algorithms to
minimize their rebalancing costs. He starts the day with zero initial positions in
both the stock and the money market account.5 The target a˜ is jointly normally
distributed with the stock value v˜, has a mean of zero, a variance σ2a˜ > 0, and
a correlation ρ ∈ [0, 1] with v˜. When ρ is 0, the rebalancer is initially unin-
formed. However, if ρ > 0, then we can think of the rebalancer as being initially
informed about v˜ but subject to random binding non-public risk limits.6 The
rebalancer is risk-neutral and maximizes the expected value of his final wealth
subject to the terminal stock position constraint. The rebalancer’s order for the
stock at time n, n = 1, ..., N , is denoted by ∆θRn , and the terminal constraint
requires ∆θRN = a˜− θRN−1 at time N .
5 Both the insider and the rebalancer finance their stock trading by borrowing/lending. This
assumption simplifies the notation for their objective functions but is without loss of generality.
6The fact that the terminal value v˜ is measured in dollars while the trading target a˜ is measured
in shares is not problematic for v˜ and a˜ being correlated random variables.
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3. Noise traders submit net stock orders at times n, n = 1, ..., N , that are ex-
ogenously given by Brownian motion increments ∆wn. These increments are
normally distributed with zero-mean and variance σ2w∆ for a constant σw > 0.
We assume that w is independent of v˜ and a˜.
4. Competitive risk-neutral market makers observe the aggregate net order flow
yn at times n, n = 1, ..., N , where
yn := ∆θ
I
n + ∆θ
R
n + ∆wn, y0 := 0. (1.1)
Given competition and risk-neutrality, market makers clear the market (i.e.,
trade −yn) at the stock price pn set to be
pn = E[v˜|σ(y1, ..., yn)], n = 1, 2, ..., N, p0 = 0, (1.2)
where σ(y1, ..., yn) is the sigma-algebra generated by the order flow history.
The constrained rebalancer’s presence is the main difference between our setting
and Kyle (1985) as well as the multi-agent settings in Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1996). As we shall see, the rebalancer’s presence
produces new stylized features such as autocorrelated order flow.
Because all initial positions are assumed to be zero (i.e., θI0 = θ
R
0 = 0), the insider
chooses orders ∆θIn ∈ σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1) at times n, n = 1, 2, ..., N, to maximize
E
[
θIN(v˜ − pN) + θIN−1∆pN + ...+ θI1∆p2
∣∣∣σ(v˜)] = E[ N∑
n=1
(v˜ − pn)∆θIn
∣∣∣σ(v˜)] . (1.3)
On the other hand, the rebalancer faces the terminal constraint θRN = a˜. Therefore,
he submits orders ∆θRn ∈ σ(a˜, y1, ..., yn−1) at times n, n = 1, 2, ..., N − 1, to maximize
E
[
a˜(v˜ − pN) + θRN−1∆pN + ...+ θR1 ∆p2
∣∣∣σ(a˜)] = ρσv˜
σa˜
a˜2 − E
[
N∑
n=1
(a˜− θRn−1)∆pn
∣∣∣σ(a˜)] ,
(1.4)
given the trading target constraint θRN = a˜. The equality in (1.4) follows from
pN =
∑N
n=1 ∆pn, p0 = 0, and E[v˜|σ(a˜)] = ρσv˜σa˜ a˜. As proven in the appendix, the
insider’s problem (1.3) and the rebalancer’s problem (1.4) are both quadratic opti-
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mization problems. We also note that the insider’s, market makers’, and rebalancer’s
information sets are not nested.
Definition 1.1. A Baysian Nash equilibrium is a collection of functions (θIn, θ
R
n , pn)
such that:
(i) given the functions (θRn , pn), the strategy θ
I
n maximizes the insider’s objective
(1.3),
(ii) given the functions (θIn, pn), the strategy θ
R
n maximizes the rebalancer’s objective
(1.4),
(iii) given the functions (θIn, θ
R
n ), the pricing rule pn satisfies (1.2).
To clarify this definition, we recall the Doob-Dynkin lemma: For any random
variable B and any σ(B)-measurable random variable A we can find a deterministic
function f such that A = f(B). Therefore, we can write θRn = f
R
n (a˜, y1, . . . , yn−1),
θIn = f
I
n(v˜, y1, . . . , yn−1), and pn = f
p
n(y1, . . . , yn) for three deterministic functions f
R
n ,
f In, and f
p
n. Definition 1.1 then means that the functions f
R
n , f
I
n, and f
p
n are fixed
whereas the realization of the aggregate order flow variables y1, ..., yn vary with the
controls θI and θR.
In what follows, our goal is to construct a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium in
which the following three properties hold: First, the insider’s and rebalancer’s optimal
trading strategies take the forms:7
∆θRn = β
R
n
(
a˜− θRn−1
)
+ αRn qn−1, θ
R
0 = 0, (1.5)
∆θIn = β
I
n
(
v˜ − pn−1
)
, θI0 = 0, (1.6)
where (βRn , β
I
n, α
R
n )
N
n=1 are constants with β
R
N = 1 and α
R
N = 0. Second, the pricing
rule has the dynamics
∆pn = λnyn + µnqn−1, p0 := 0, (1.7)
where (λn, µn)
N
n=1 are constants. Third, the process qn has the dynamics
∆qn = rnyn + snqn−1, q0 := 0, (1.8)
7If an additional term αInqn−1 is included in the insider’s strategy in (1.6), we find that α
I
n is
zero in equilibrium. Contact the authors for a proof of this result.
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for constants (rn, sn)
N
n=1. The rebalancer and insider are not restricted to use linear
strategies like (1.5) and (1.6). However, we will prove that they optimally choose
such strategies in the equilibrium we construct.
The rebalancer’s trading target a˜ necessitates the introduction of the process qn
which is our model’s main new feature. Much like pn is a state variable giving the
market maker beliefs about the stock valuation, qn is a state variable indicating market
maker beliefs about the rebalancer’s remaining trading given the prior trading history.
There are two things to note about qn. First, the rebalancer’s trades are not limited
to be a deterministic function of his target a˜. Rather, his trades can also depend
on the realized prior order flow history as reflected in qn. This is in contrast to the
deterministic rebalancer trades in Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2014). Second, if
equations (1.5) through (1.8) define a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then the same
equilibrium (with the same prices and orders) is obtained if rn and sn are replaced
with xrn and xsn and µn and α
R
n are replaced with µn/x, and α
R
n /x for any scaler
x > 0. Thus, in the equilibrium considered below, we normalize rn and sn so that
qn is the market makers’ expectation of the rebalancer’s remaining demand a˜− θRn at
time n given the observed history of aggregate orders:8
qn = E[a˜− θRn |σ(y1, ..., yn)], n = 1, ..., N. (1.9)
The term a˜ − θRn−1 in (1.5) plays two roles in the rebalancer’s strategy: It is the
distance between the rebalancer’s current position and his final trading target a˜, and,
in equilibrium, it is also private information that is useful in learning about possible
stock price misvaluation v˜ − pn−1:
E[v˜ − pn−1|σ(a˜, y1, ..., yn−1)] = E[v˜ − pn−1|σ(a˜− θRn−1 − qn−1, y1, ..., yn−1)]
= E[v˜ − pn−1|σ(a˜− θRn−1 − qn−1)].
(1.10)
The first equality follows from qn−1, θRn−1 ∈ σ(a˜, y1, ..., yn−1). The second equality
follows from the independence between v˜ − pn−1 and y1, ..., yn−1 as well as the inde-
pendence between a˜−θRn−1−qn−1 and y1, ..., yn−1. Thus, a˜−θRn−1−qn−1 is, in general,
incrementally informative about v˜ beyond the past order flow information already re-
flected in pn−1. In particular, it is informative at n > 1 even if ρ = 0 (i.e., a˜ becomes
informative about v˜ even if a˜ and v˜ are ex ante independent) because the rebalancer
8 An alternative scaling would be to set qn equal to E[yn|σ(y1, ..., yn)].
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can filter the past order flow history to learn about v˜ better than the market makers.
This is a significant difference from deterministic rebalancing rules.
Similarly, the term v˜ − pn−1 in (1.6) plays two roles in the insider’s strategy: It
is both private information about the stock value and, in equilibrium, informative
about the remaining demand a˜− θRn−1 for the rebalancer:
E[a˜− θRn−1|σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)]
= qn−1 + E[a˜− θRn−1 − qn−1|σ(v˜ − pn−1, y1, ..., yn−1)]
= qn−1 + E[a˜− θRn−1 − qn−1|σ(v˜ − pn−1)].
(1.11)
The first equality follows from qn−1, pn−1 ∈ σ(y1, ..., yn−1). The second equality follows
from the independence between v˜ − pn−1 and y1, ..., yn−1 as well as the independence
between a˜− θRn−1 − qn−1 and y1, ..., yn−1.
1.1 Equilibrium
In this section we characterize sufficient conditions for existence of a linear Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the form in (1.5) through (1.8). The analysis follows the logic of
Foster and Viswanathan (1996) closely.
To begin, we consider a complete set of possible candidate values for the equilib-
rium constants
λn, µn, rn, sn, β
R
n , α
R
n , β
I
n, n = 1, . . . , N, (1.12)
with
βRN = 1, α
R
N = 0. (1.13)
The restrictions in (1.13) at date N reflect the fact that the rebalancer must achieve
his target a˜ after his last round of trade. Our goal of this section is to identify sufficient
conditions for a candidate set of specific coefficient values to be an equilibrium. We
do this in three steps.
The first step takes a set of candidate constants (1.12)-(1.13) and computes (using
the terminology and notation of Foster and Viswanathan 1996) the following system
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of “hat” price and order flow processes
∆θˆIn := β
I
n(v˜ − pˆn−1) θˆI0 := 0, (1.14)
∆θˆRn := β
R
n (a˜− θˆRn−1) + αRn qˆn−1, θˆR0 := 0, (1.15)
yˆn := ∆θˆ
I
n + ∆θˆ
R
n + ∆wn, yˆ0 := 0, (1.16)
∆pˆn := λnyˆn + µnqˆn−1, pˆ0 := 0, (1.17)
∆qˆn := rnyˆn + snqˆn−1, qˆ0 := 0. (1.18)
The system of processes (∆θˆIn,∆θˆ
R
n , yˆn,∆pˆn,∆qˆn, ) is fully specified (autonomous) by
the coefficients (1.12). Furthermore, given the zero-mean and joint normality of v˜,
a˜, and w, the “hat” system (1.14)-(1.18) is also zero-mean and jointly normal. We
define the variances and covariance for the “hat” dynamics, n = 0, 1, ..., N , by9
Σ(1)n := V
[
a˜− θˆRn − qˆn
]
, (1.19)
Σ(2)n := V[v˜ − pˆn
]
, (1.20)
Σ(3)n := E
[(
a˜− θˆRn − qˆn
)
(v˜ − pˆn)
]
. (1.21)
These moments are “post-trade” at time n in that they reflect the trading up-through
and including the time n order flow yn. In other words, they are inputs for trading
round n+ 1. The initial variances and covariance at n = 0 are exogenuously given by
Σ
(1)
0 = σ
2
a˜, Σ
(2)
0 = σ
2
v˜ , Σ
(3)
0 = ρ. (1.22)
The “hat” processes (1.14)-(1.18) will be used to make the problems (1.3) and (1.4)
analytically tractable in the sense that both the insider’s problem and the rebalancer’s
problem can be described by low dimensional state processes (see 1.33 and 1.42 below).
In particular, the “hat” processes denote the processes that agents believe other agents
believe describe the equilibrium. In equilibrium, these beliefs must be correct. This
consistency requirement imposes two groups of conditions that a set of candidate
constants (1.12) must satisfy to be equilibrium constants. The next two steps explain
these conditions.
The second step requires the coefficients (λn, µn, sn, rn)
N
n=1 of the price and order
flow state variable processes (pn, qn)
N
n=1 to be consistent in equilibrium with Bayesian
9We note that Σ
(2)
n must be non-increasing over time (as in Kyle 1985) but Σ
(1)
n might not be.
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updating. In particular, if market makers believe that the insider and rebalancer are
following the “hat” strategies, then we can re-write (1.2) as
∆pˆn = λn
(
yˆn − E[yˆn|σ(yˆ1, ..., yˆn−1)]
)
= λn
(
yˆn − [βRn E[a˜− θˆRn−1|σ(yˆ1, ..., yˆn−1)] + αRn qˆn−1]
)
= λn
(
yˆn − (αRn + βRn )qˆn−1
)
,
(1.23)
for n = 1, ..., N . The first equality follows from the fact that, given the jointly Gaus-
sian structure of the “hat” processes, conditional expectations are linear projections.
The second equality follows from (i) the definition of the aggregate order flow (1.16),
(ii) the independence between v˜− pˆn−1 and past order flows, and (iii) the assumption
that the noise trader orders are zero–mean and i.i.d. over time. The final equality
follows from the normalization that qˆn−1 = E[a˜− θˆRn−1|σ(yˆ1, ..., yˆn−1)]. Comparing the
last line of (1.23) with (1.7) and using that λn equals the projection coefficient
Cov(v˜ − pˆn−1, yˆn − E[yˆn|σyˆ1, ..., yˆn−1)])
V(yn − E[yˆn|σ(yˆ1, ..., yˆn−1)]) (1.24)
gives restrictions on the coefficients of the price process in terms of the insider and
rebalancer strategy coefficients. A similar logic can also be used to derive restrictions
on the coefficients of the qˆn process in terms of the investor strategy coefficients.
These calculations lead to the following four restrictions on the state variable and
strategy constants in a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium for n = 1, ..., N (see the
proof of Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.1):
λn =
βInΣ
(2)
n−1 + β
R
n Σ
(3)
n−1
(βIn)
2Σ
(2)
n−1 + (βRn )2Σ
(1)
n−1 + 2βInβRn Σ
(3)
n−1 + σ2w∆
, (1.25)
rn =
(1− βRn )
(
βInΣ
(3)
n−1 + β
R
n Σ
(1)
n−1
)
(βIn)
2Σ
(2)
n−1 + (βRn )2Σ
(1)
n−1 + 2βInβRn Σ
(3)
n−1 + σ2w∆
, (1.26)
µn = −λn(αRn + βRn ), (1.27)
sn = −(1 + rn)(αRn + βRn ). (1.28)
Here the conditional variances and covariance from (1.19)-(1.21) can recursively be
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computed as
Σ(1)n = (1− βRn )
(
(1− βRn − rnβRn )Σ(1)n−1 − rnβInΣ(3)n−1
)
, (1.29)
Σ(2)n = (1− λnβIn)Σ(2)n−1 − λnβRn Σ(3)n−1, (1.30)
Σ(3)n = (1− βRn )
(
(1− λnβIn)Σ(3)n−1 − λnβRn Σ(1)n−1
)
. (1.31)
We note the “block” structure: The values of the updating coefficients λn and rn just
depend on the strategy coefficients βRn and β
I
n at date n and the incoming variances
and covariance from time n−1 (along with the exogenous noise trading variance σ2w).
The post-trade variances and covariance Σ
(1)
n , Σ
(2)
n , and Σ
(3)
n at time n just depend
on the updating coefficients λn and rn at time n, the strategy coefficients at time n,
and the prior variances and covariance from time n− 1. Lastly, µn and sn depend on
λn and µn as well as the rebalancer’s set of strategy coefficients (β
R
n , α
R
n ).
The third and last step begins by deriving value functions for the two strategic
investors (see 1.3 and 1.4). Consider first the insider at a generic time n. As in
Foster and Viswanathan (1996), the insider not only knows the final stock value v˜,
but also the extent to which the actual “unhatted” prices, quantity expectations,
and rebalancer’s positions (i.e., pn, qn, and θ
R
n given by 1.5, 1.7, and 1.8) given her
actual trades ∆θI1, . . . ,∆θ
I
n deviate from the “hatted” values pˆn, qˆn, and θˆ
R
n given
by (1.17), (1.18), and (1.15)) if she had instead traded according to the candidate
“hat” insider process ∆θˆI1, . . . ,∆θˆ
I
n in (1.14). In deriving the equilibrium, we need to
allow for the possibility of past suboptimal play. Hence, the “un-hatted” variables are
the variable values given her actual (potentially arbitrary) orders whereas the “hat”
variables are not affected by actual orders. When the rebalancer’s strategy is taken
to be fixed by (1.5), it is characterized by the two sequences of candidate coefficients
βR1 , . . . , β
R
N and α
R
1 , . . . , α
R
N . However, even though the rebalancer’s strategy is fixed,
its realizations are subject to the insider’s choice of θI since the aggregate order flow
affects the rebalancer’s actual orders. Similar statements apply for prices pn and pˆn
and the quantity expectations qn and qˆn.
Based on Foster and Viswanathan (1996), it would be natural to consider
v˜ − pˆn, qˆn, θˆRn − θRn , qˆn − qn, pˆn − pn. (1.32)
as state variables for the insider’s problem. However, we show that the following two
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composite state variables are sufficient statistics for the insider’s value function:
X(1)n := v˜ − pn, X(2)n := (θˆRn − θRn ) + (qˆn − qn) + Σ
(3)
n
Σ
(2)
n
(
v˜ − pˆn
)
, n = 0, ..., N. (1.33)
From a technical point of view, this is a substantial reduction in the set of state
variables from (1.32). This surely seems like the minimum number of state variables
necessary for the insider’s problem. Lemma A.2 in Appendix A ensures that these
processes are observable for the insider. From (1.33), we see that in equilibrium, with
pn = pˆn, qn = qˆn, and θ
R
n = θˆ
R
n , we have the relation
X(2)n =
Σ
(3)
n
Σ
(2)
n
X(1)n , n = 0, 1..., N. (1.34)
Lemma A.2 in Appendix A shows that the insider’s value function for n =
0, 1, ..., N has the quadratic form
max
∆θI
k
∈σ(v˜,y1,...,yk−1)
n+1≤k≤N
E
[ N∑
k=n+1
(v˜ − pk)∆θIk
∣∣∣σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn)]
= I(0)n + I
(1,1)
n (X
(1)
n )
2 + I(1,2)n X
(1)
n X
(2)
n + I
(2,2)
n (X
(2)
n )
2,
(1.35)
where I
(0)
n , I
(1,1)
n , I
(1,2)
n , and I
(2,2)
n are constants. Furthermore, Lemma A.2 also shows
that the insider’s problem (1.35) is quadratic in ∆θIn. The first-order-condition for
(1.35) produces the insider’s optimal order candidate process
∆θIn = γ
(1)
n X
(1)
n−1 + γ
(2)
n X
(2)
n−1, n = 1, ..., N, (1.36)
where
γ(1)n :=
−1+I(1,2)n rn+2I(1,1)n λn
2(I
(2,2)
n r2n+λn(−1+I(1,2)n rn+I(1,1)n λn))
, (1.37)
γ(2)n := −βRn + −2I
(2,2)
n rn(−1+βRn )+I(1,2)n λn−βRn λn(I(1,2)n +1)
2(I
(2,2)
n r2n+λn(−1+I(1,2)n rn+I(1,1)n λn))
. (1.38)
The associated second-order condition for the insider’s optimal strategy is
I(2,2)n r
2
n + I
(1,2)
n rnλn + I
(1,1)
n λ
2
n < λn. (1.39)
By inserting the insider’s candidate strategy (1.36)-(1.38) into the expectation in
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(1.35), we can determine the insider’s value function coefficients recursively. More
specifically, the expectation is computed in equation (A.8) Appendix A and the re-
sulting recursions are given by B.1-B.3 in Appendix B.
By equating the coefficients in (1.36) with (1.6) and using the equilibrium condi-
tion (1.34), we get the following condition on the insider’s strategy coefficient
βIn = γ
(1)
n + γ
(2)
n
Σ
(3)
n−1
Σ
(2)
n−1
, n = 1..., N. (1.40)
For fixed Σ
(1)
n , ...,Σ
(3)
n , we can use the linear equations (1.29)-(1.31) to express Σ
(1)
n−1, ...,
Σ
(3)
n−1 in terms of rn, λn, β
I
n, β
R
n . Equations (1.37)-(1.38) and (1.25)-(1.26) can then
be used to see that (1.40) is a fifth–degree polynomial in (βRn , β
I
n) whenever Σ
(i)
n ,
i = 1, 2, 3, and I
(i,j)
n , i = 1, 2 and i ≤ j ≤ 2, are fixed.
We next turn to the rebalancer’s problem. Again, based on Foster and Viswanathan
(1996) it would be natural to consider
a˜− θˆRn , qˆn, θˆRn − θRn , qˆn − qn, pˆn − pn, (1.41)
as the rebalancer’s state variables. However, now just three composite state variable
are sufficient statistics for the rebalancer’s value function
Y (1)n := a˜− θRn , Y (2)n := (pˆn − pn) + Σ
(3)
n
Σ
(1)
n
(a˜− θˆRn − qˆn), Y (3)n := qn, n = 0, 1, ..., N.
(1.42)
Lemma A.4 in Appendix A ensures that these processes are observable for the re-
balancer. Based on (1.42), we see that in equilibrium, with pn = pˆn, qn = qˆn, and
θIn = θˆ
I
n, we have the relation
Y (2)n =
Σ
(3)
n
Σ
(1)
n
(Y (1)n − Y (3)n ), n = 1, ..., N. (1.43)
When the insider’s strategy is fixed as in (1.6), Lemma A.4 in Appendix A shows
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that the rebalancer’s value function becomes
max
∆θR
k
∈σ(a˜,y1,...,yk−1)
n+1≤k≤N−1
− E
[ N∑
k=n+1
(a˜− θRk−1)∆pk
∣∣∣σ(a˜, y1, ..., yn)]
= L(0)n +
∑
1≤i≤j≤3
L(i,j)n Y
(i)
n Y
(j)
n ,
(1.44)
where L
(0)
n , ..., L
(3,3)
n are constants. Lemma A.4 also ensures that the rebalancer’s
problem (1.44) is quadratic in ∆θRn . The corresponding first-order-condition produces
the candidate optimizer for the rebalancer’s order
∆θRn = δ
(1)
n Y
(1)
n−1 + δ
(2)
n Y
(2)
n−1 + δ
(3)
n Y
(3)
n−1, n = 1, ..., N, (1.45)
where
δ(1)n :=
2L
(1,1)
n − L(1,3)n rn + λn + L(1,2)n λn
2
(
L
(1,1)
n − L(1,3)n rn + L(3,3)n r2n + λn(L(1,2)n − L(2,3)n rn + L(2,2)n λn)
) , (1.46)
δ(2)n := −βIn +
L
(1,2)
n − rn(L(2,3)n + L(1,3)n βIn) + L(1,2)n βInλn + 2(L(1,1)n βIn + L(2,2)n λn)
2
(
L
(1,1)
n − L(1,3)n rn + L(3,3)n r2n + λn(L(1,2)n − L(2,3)n rn + L(2,2)n λn)
) , (1.47)
δ(3)n :=
(
− 2L(3,3)n rn − L(1,3)n (−1 + αRn + rnαRn + βRn + rnβRn ) + L(2,3)n λn
+(αRn + β
R
n )
(
2L
(3,3)
n rn(1 + rn) + λn(L
(1,2)
n − L(2,3)n − 2L(2,3)n rn + 2L(2,2)n λn)
))
2
(
L
(1,1)
n − L(1,3)n rn + L(3,3)n r2n + λn(L(1,2)n − L(2,3)n rn + L(2,2)n λn)
) . (1.48)
The associated second-order condition for the rebalancer’s optimal strategy is
L(1,1)n + L
(3,3)
n r
2
n + L
(1,2)
n λn + L
(2,2)
n λ
2
n < L
(1,3)
n rn + L
(2,3)
n rnλn. (1.49)
Similar to the insider’s problem, by inserting the rebalancer’s candidate strategy
(1.45)-(1.48) into the expectation in (1.44) we can find the rebalancer’s value function
coefficients recursively (see equations B.4-B.9 in Appendix B).
By equating the coefficients in (1.45) with (1.5) and using the equilibrium condi-
tion (1.43) we get the requirements
βRn = δ
(1)
n + δ
(2)
n
Σ
(3)
n−1
Σ
(1)
n−1
, αRn = δ
(3)
n − δ(2)n Σ
(3)
n−1
Σ
(1)
n−1
, n = 1, ..., N. (1.50)
Similarly to (1.40), the first part of (1.50) is fifth–degree polynomial in (βRn , β
I
n)
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whenever Σ
(i)
n , i = 1, 2, 3, and L
(i,j)
n , i = 1, 2, 3 and i ≤ j ≤ 3, are fixed.
Our main theoretical result is the following:
Theorem 1.2. If the constants (1.12) and the associated terms
Σ(1)n ,Σ
(2)
n ,Σ
(3)
n , (I
(i,j)
n )1≤i≤j≤2, (L
(i,j)
n )1≤i≤j≤3, n = 1, ..., N, (1.51)
satisfy the pricing coefficient relations (1.25)-(1.28), the variances and covariance
recursions (1.29)-(1.31), the rebalancer’s target constraint (1.13), the value function
coefficient recursions (B.1)-(B.3) and (B.4)-(B.9), the second-order-conditions (1.39)
and (1.49) as well as the equilibrium conditions (1.40) and (1.50), then a linear
Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists of the form given in (1.5)-(1.8). Furthermore, we
have
rN = 0, µN = −λN , sN = −1, βIN =
( 1
2λN
− Σ
(3)
N−1
2Σ
(2)
N−1
)
, λN > 0. (1.52)
This characterization result is the analogue of Proposition 1 in Foster and Viswa-
nathan (1996). As already noted, the new feature in our model, compared to Foster
and Viswanathan (1996) and Kyle (1985), is the presence of the qn process in the
equilibrium price dynamics (1.7). This produces new stylized features including au-
tocorrelation of the equilibrium aggregate order flow:
E[yn|σ(y1, ..., yn−1)]
= E[∆θIn + ∆θRn + ∆wn|σ(y1, ..., yn−1)]
= αRn qn−1 + E[βIn(v˜ − pn−1) + βRn (a˜− θRn−1)|σ(y1, ..., yn−1)]
= (αRn + β
R
n ) qn−1,
(1.53)
which, in general, is not zero. The last equality follows, in part, from the earlier
observation that, in equilibrium, qn−1 is the conditional expectation of a˜− θRn−1 given
the prior trading history.
1.2 Algorithm
This section describes an algorithm for searching numerically for a linear Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. The algorithm is similar in logic to the algorithm in Section V in
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Foster and Viswanathan (1996), except that our algorithm requires three constants as
inputs (due to the presence of two strategic agents) whereas Foster and Viswanathan
(1996) only requires one constant as an input.
The algorithm starts by taking as inputs three conjectured conditional moments
for the final time N round of trading:10
Σ
(1)
N−1 > 0, Σ
(2)
N−1 > 0, Σ
(3)
N−1 ∈ R such that
(
Σ
(3)
N−1
)2 ≤ Σ(1)N−1Σ(2)N−1. (1.54)
The algorithm then proceeds through backward induction.
Starting step for trading time N : We need (λN , β
I
N) to satisfy (1.25) for n = N
and the last two parts of (1.52). Given those two constants (λN , β
I
N), we can define
βRN := 1, α
R
N := rN := 0, µN := −λN , sN := −1. (1.55)
Because of the rebalancer’s terminal constraint, his last round of trading (i.e., at time
N) does not involve any optimization, and so we have
E
[−(a˜− θRN−1)∆pN |σ(a˜, y1, ..., yN−1)] = −Y (1)N−1(λN(Y (1)N−1 + βINY (2)N−1)− λNY (3)N−1).
This relation implies that the rebalancer’s value function coefficients for n = N − 1
are given by
L
(1,1)
N−1 = −λN , L(1,2)N−1 = −λNβIN , L(1,3)N−1 = λN , L(2,2)N−1 = L(2,3)N−1 = L(3,3)N−1 = 0. (1.56)
On the other hand, the insider’s problem in the last round of trading is the similar
to her problem in any other round of trading. By inserting the boundary conditions
I
(1,1)
N = I
(1,2)
N = I
(2,2)
N = 0
into the recursions (B.1)-(B.3), we produce the value function coefficients I
(i,j)
N−1.
10We do not take the post-trade date N moments (Σ
(1)
N ,Σ
(2)
N ,Σ
(3)
N ) as inputs because they are
after the last round of trading. In addition, (1.29) and (1.31) together with the terminal condition
βRN = 1 imply that Σ
(1)
N = Σ
(3)
N = 0.
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Induction step: At each time n the algorithm takes the following terms as inputs:
Σ(1)n ,Σ
(2)
n ,Σ
(3)
n , (I
(i,j)
n )1≤i≤j≤2, (L
(i,j)
n )1≤i≤j≤3. (1.57)
We first find the constants (λn, rn,Σ
(1)
n−1,Σ
(2)
n−1,Σ
(3)
n−1, β
I
n, β
R
n ) by requiring that (1.25)-
(1.26), (1.29)-(1.31) with Σ
(1)
n−1 > 0,Σ
(2)
n−1 > 0 and (Σ
(3)
n−1
)2 ≤ Σ(1)n−1Σ(2)n−1, (1.40), the
first part of (1.50), as well as the second-order conditions (1.39)-(1.49) hold. These are
seven polynomial equations in seven unknown constants. We can then subsequently
define (µn, sn) by (1.27)-(1.28) and α
R
n by the second part of (1.50).
Next, the value function coefficients (I
(i,j)
n−1)1≤i≤j≤2 and (L
(i,j)
n−1)1≤i≤j≤3 at time n−1
are found by the recursions (B.1)-(B.3) and (B.4)-(B.9).
Termination: The iteration above is continued back to time n = 0. If the result-
ing values at time n = 0 satisfy (1.22) the algorithm terminates and the computed
coefficients produce a linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, we adjust the
conjectured starting input values in (1.54) and start the algorithm all over.
2 Numerical results
As is common with discrete-time Kyle-type models, we do not have analytic com-
parative results about the properties of our model. However, we have conducted a
variety of numerical experiments to illustrate properties of the model. The baseline
specification for our model has N = 10 rounds of trading, the variance of the terminal
stock value v˜ is normalized to σ2v˜ = 1, the total variance of the Brownian motion noise
trading order flow over the N periods is fixed at σ2w = 4, the variance of the trading
target a˜ is σ2a˜ = 1, and the correlation between the trading target a˜ and the terminal
stock value v˜ is ρ = 0 (i.e., v˜ and a˜ are ex ante independent). In our analysis, we
vary the correlation ρ and the variance of the trading target σ2a˜.
The two graphs in Figure 1 show the price impact of order flow parameter λn over
time. The various dashed lines are for different parameterizations of our model. For
comparison, the solid (blue) line is the corresponding price impact in Kyle (1985) in
which the rebalancer is absent. In the first round of trading at time n = 1, rebalancing
noise by itself would reduce the value of λ1 relative to Kyle (1985). However, in
equilibrium, the insider’s trading strategy also changes. The net effect in this example
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is that λ1 increases relative to Kyle (1985).
11 At later times n > 2, the price impacts
are lower than in Kyle. The result is an S-shaped twist in λn over time. The price
impact trajectory in our model also differs from Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel
(2014) in which price impacts have an inverted U -shape (see their Figure 1).
Figure 1A varies the variance of the trading target σ2a˜ while holding ρ fixed at 0.
We see that the S-shaped twist in λn becomes stronger for larger values of σ
2
a˜. When
σ2a˜ is high enough, the price impact of order flow can even be non-monotone over time
(see the dashed line corresponding to σ2a˜ = 3.7, which is comparable to the total daily
noise trader order variance σ2w = 4). Figure 1B varies the correlation ρ between the
terminal stock value v˜ and the trading target a˜ while holding the variance σ2a˜ fixed at
1. Here again, there is an asymmetric impact of ρ over time relative to our baseline
model with ρ = 0. At early times, λn is increasing in the correlation ρ, but at later
times, λn is decreasing in ρ. This is because increasing ρ changes some rebalancing
trades from noise into informative order flow.
Figure 1: Plot of (λn)
N
n=1 for the parameters σ
2
v˜ = 1, σ
2
w = 4, N = 10, σ
2
a˜ = 1 (right
only), and ρ = 0 (left only).
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0.55
0.60
A: Kyle (———), σ2a˜ = 0.48 (−−−), B: Kyle (———), ρ = 0 (−−−),
σ2a˜ = 1 (− · − · −), σ2a˜ = 3.7 (− · · − · · −). ρ = 0.25 (− · − · −), ρ = 0.47 (− · · − · · −).
Figure 2 shows the trajectory of the variance Σ
(2)
n of v˜ − pn−1 over time where
(pn)
N
n=1 are the equilibrium prices. In our baseline case where ρ = 0, there is faster
information revelation at early times, but slower information revelation later towards
the end. When ρ > 0, public uncertainty about v˜ falls faster in our model than
11 We see in equation (1.25) that λn is non-monotone in the aggressiveness of informed trading.
Thus, there may also be parameterizations for which our model has an inverted U -shape for λn.
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in Kyle’s model. This is because, with ρ > 0, the rebalancer also trades, from the
beginning, on information about the stock value.
Figure 2: Plot of (Σ
(2)
n )Nn=1 for the parameters σ
2
v˜ = 1, σ
2
w = 4, N = 10, σ
2
a˜ = 1 (right
only), and ρ = 0 (left only).
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A: Kyle (———), σ2a˜ = 0.48 (−−−), B: Kyle (———), ρ = 0 (−−−),
σ2a˜ = 1 (− · − · −), σ2a˜ = 3.7 (− · · − · · −). ρ = 0.25 (− · − · −), ρ = 0.47 (− · · − · · −).
Figure 3 shows the insider’s strategy coefficients βIn, which measures how aggres-
sively she trades on her private information v˜ − pn−1 over time. As in Kyle, the
intensity of informed trading in our model increases as time approaches the terminal
time N . This is consistent with the fact that the price impact of order flow λn in
Figure 1 shrinks as time passes. We also see that as the variance of the trading tar-
get σ2a˜ increases, the informed investor trades more aggressively at early dates, less
so in the middle, and then slightly more aggressively again towards the end. The
informed trader’s increased initial aggressiveness reflects the fact that there is more
noise, due to the rebalancer’s trading target a˜, in which to hide the insider’s orders.
In addition, if ρ > 0, insider trading aggressiveness increases somewhat due to a
Holden-Subrahmanyam race–to–trade competition effect. The apparent size of the
changes in βI1 – which are on the order of 10 percent – are visually understated in
Figure 3 because of the vertical scaling (due to the size of βI10).
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12 With ρ > 0, there are two differences relative to Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992). First,
the insider still has better information than the rebalancer if ρ < 1. Thus, our analysis with ρ > 0
is more comparable to Foster and Viswanathan (1994), which has two asymmetrically informed
traders, one of which is better informed than the other. Second, trading by our rebalancer, when
he is informed about v˜, is constrained by his terminal target a˜. This works against rat races with
extremely aggressive rebalancer trading.
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Figure 3: Plot of (βIn)
N
n=1 for the parameters σ
2
v˜ = 1, σ
2
w = 4, N = 10, σ
2
a˜ = 1 (right
only), and ρ = 0 (left only).
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A: Kyle (———), σ2a˜ = 0.48 (−−−), B: Kyle (———), ρ = 0 (−−−),
σ2a˜ = 1 (− · − · −), σ2a˜ = 3.7 (− · · − · · −). ρ = 0.25 (− · − · −), ρ = 0.47 (− · · − · · −).
Figure 4 shows the insider’s expected trades (i.e., conditional on her information)
over the day for the specific value realization v˜ = 1 and averaged over a˜ and noise
trader paths w. Kyle’s model is the solid (blue) line, whereas the dotted lines represent
various parameterizations of our model. Unlike Kyle’s model, our model produces a
slight U -shaped trading pattern; that is, our insider expects ex ante to trade somewhat
more initially and again at the end of the day. However, the U -shape is not big. Since
the trading expectations in Figure 4 are linear in the realization of v˜, the expected
informed trading volume is also slightly U -shaped for other realizations of v˜.
Next, we turn to the rebalancer. The rebalancer’s trades reflect a variety of
considerations: First, the rebalancer needs to reach his trading target a˜ at time N .
Second, he wants to reach this target at the lowest cost possible. Thus, to the extent
that his orders have a price impact, he splits up his orders to take into account the
pattern of the price impact coefficients λn over time. Third, the rebalancer engages
in “sunshine trading.” In particular, early orders signal predictable future orders at
later dates, which, from (1.23), will have no price impact. Fourth, the rebalancer
understands that price pressure from his trades creates incentives for the insider to
trade. At later dates, this can actually be beneficial for the rebalancer. For example,
if early uninformed rebalancer orders raise prices, then, in expectation, the insider
should then buy less/sell more in the future, thereby putting downward pressure
on later prices which, in turn, reduces the expected cost of subsequent rebalancer
20
Figure 4: Plot of E[∆θIn|σ(v˜)] for n = 1, 2, ..., 10. The parameters are σ2v˜ = 1, σ2w = 4,
N = 10, σ2a˜ = 1 (right only), ρ = 0 (left only), and the realization of v˜ equals 1.
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A: Kyle (———), σ2a˜ = 0.48 (−−−), B: Kyle (———), ρ = 0 (−−−),
σ2a˜ = 1 (− · − · −), σ2a˜ = 3.7 (− · · − · · −). ρ = 0.25 (− · − · −), ρ = 0.47 (− · · − · · −).
buying. Fifth, the rebalancer trades on information about the asset value v˜. If
ρ > 0, the rebalancer starts out with stock valuation information. However, even
if the rebalancer is initially uninformed about v˜ (i.e., ρ = 0), he still acquires stock
valuation information over time (see 1.10) that he can use to reduce his rebalancing
costs and even, possibly, to earn a trading profit. In particular, he can filter the
aggregate order flow to learn about the insider’s trading, and thereby learn about v˜,
better than the market makers.
To gain further intuition, we rearrange (1.5) to decompose the rebalancer’s order
at time n as follows:
∆θRn = β
R
n (a˜− θRn−1 − qn−1) + (αRn + βRn )qn−1. (2.1)
From (1.9), second component, (αRn + β
R
n )qn−1, is the market makers’ expectation
E[∆θRn |σ(y1, . . . , yn−1)] of the rebalancer’s order at time n. This amount is traded at
time n with no price impact. The first component, βRn (a˜−θRn−1−qn−1), represents the
combined effect of i) strategic trading by the rebalancer on his private information,
a˜ − θRn−1 − qn−1, which is informative about v˜ − pn−1 (see 1.10), and ii) rebalancing
trading given that the remaining amount that the rebalancer actually needs to trade
(i.e., a˜− θRn−1) differs, in general, from the market makers’ expectation qn−1.
Figure 5 shows trajectories for the rebalancer’s strategy coefficients βRn and α
R
n .
21
We use the decomposition (2.1) to interpret them. Since αRn +β
R
n is positive but small
until time N , the rebalancer trades a relatively small fraction of his expected trading
gap qn−1 over time until time N at which time αRN + β
R
N = 1 and then he trades the
full remaining gap. In addition, the fact that βRn is positive means that the rebalancer
trades in the direction of his private information. He does this for two reasons: First,
the larger a˜ is relative to θRn−1 (given qn−1), the more the rebalancer must trade to
achieve his target compared to the market makers’ expectation of his trading gap.
Second, the smaller θRn−1 is relative to qn−1 (given a˜), the less the rebalancer has
actually bought relative to the market makers’ expectation, which, in turn, implies
that, given the prior observed aggregate order flows, the more the insider bought in
expectation given the rebalancer’s information. Hence, in this situation the rebalancer
infers that the market makers have, on average, underpriced the stock and, therefore,
strategically buys more/sells less stock at times n < N .
Figure 5: Plot of (αRn )
N
n=1 (below the x-axis) and of (β
R
n )
N
n=1 (above the x-axis) for
n = 1, 2, ..., 10. The parameters are σ2v˜ = 1, σ
2
w = 4, N = 10, σ
2
a˜ = 1 (right only), and
ρ = 0 (left only).
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A: σ2a˜ = 0.48 (−−−), σ2a˜ = 1 (− · − · −), B: ρ = 0 (−−−), ρ = 0.25 (− · − · −),
σ2a˜ = 3.7 (− · · − · · −). ρ = 0.47 (− · · − · · −).
Figure 6 shows the rebalancer’s ex ante expected orders over the day for the
particular realization of the trading target a˜ being equal to 1. These expectations
are taken over the terminal stock price v˜ and the noise trader order path w. These
expectations depend linearly on the realization of the trading target a˜. The graphs
show that the rebalancer’s trading strategy also has a U–shaped pattern over the
day. Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2014) obtain a similar result in their model
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with short–lived information for the insiders and static trading for the rebalancer. In
particular, with short-lived information, their insider is unable to trade dynamically
over time, which allows the rebalancer to (imperfectly) separate his order from those
of the insider. In contrast, in our model, the insider trades dynamically too. Thus,
the U -shaped pattern of rebalancing trading does not depend on the assumption of
short-lived information.
Figure 6: Plot of E[∆θRn |σ(a˜)] for n = 1, 2, ..., 10. The parameters are σ2v˜ = 1, σ2w = 4,
N = 10, σ2a˜ = 1 (right only), ρ = 0 (left only), and the realization of a˜ equals 1.
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A: σ2a˜ = 0.48 (−−−), σ2a˜ = 1 (− · − · −), B: ρ = 0 (−−−), ρ = 0.25 (− · − · −),
σ2a˜ = 3.7 (− · · − · · −). ρ = 0.47 (− · · − · · −).
The literature on optimal order execution includes many models that also pro-
duce U -shaped optimal strategies, see, e.g., Predoiu, Shaikhet, and Shreve (2011)
and the references therein. However, sunshine trading in that literature stems from
exogenously specified liquidity resilience and replenishment dynamics. In contrast,
liquidity in our equilibrium model is endogenously determined. In our model, there are
two sources of U -shaped rebalancer trading volume. First, orders from the rebalancer
early in the day signal to the market makers the size of the predictable component
of his orders at the end of the day. Second, there are also U -shaped patterns in
the standard deviation of rebalancer orders. In particular, because the rebalancer’s
trades depend on the aggregated order flow history via qn, there is variability across
the rebalancer’s order flow paths. Figure 7A shows the ex ante standard deviation
of the rebalancer’s orders over the day conditional on the rebalancer’s target a˜. Here
again, we see a U -shaped pattern.
Figure 7B plots a few paths of the rebalancer’s order flows over time. Here the
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realized stock value v˜ is 1, and the realized trading target a˜ is 0. There are 10 different
randomly selected path realizations of the noise traders’ orders. Along these paths,
we see that the rebalancer buys/sells more than his trading target a˜ at early dates
(n > 1) and then unwinds his position at later dates to achieve his trading target.
This is not manipulation. Rather, the rebalancer’s orders reflect a combination of
informed trading motives (about v˜) and uninformed rebalancing motives (due to
a˜). The rebalancer does not trade at time 1 because he does not need to rebalance
and because, initially, he does not have any stock valuation information (i.e., ρ =
0). However, at time 2 the rebalancer trades based on whether — given the value
information he gleans from being able to filter the order flow y1 better than the market
makers – he thinks the stock is over– or under–valued. Eventually, however, he must
unwind these earlier positions in order to achieve his realized trading target constraint
θRN = a˜ = 0 at the end of the day.
13 The dispersion in the paths is consistent with the
trajectory of the rebalancer order flow standard deviation. Paths for non-zero values
of a˜ involve shifting the means of these paths from zero to the appropriate ex ante
conditional means given a˜ (e.g., Figure 6 illustrates one such conditional mean order
flow trajectory for a˜ = 1).
Figure 7: Properties of the rebalancer’s orders. The parameters are N := 10, σ2w := 4,
σ2v˜ := 1, σ
2
a˜ := 1, and ρ := 0.
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)2∣∣σ(a˜)] 12 , B: 10 paths of ∆θRn
for the realization a˜ = 1. for the realizations a˜ = 0 and v˜ = 1.
13This is another example of a situation in which different traders acquire information at different
times and/or have to unwind positions in advance of definitive public announcements. See also
Foucault, Hombert, and Rosu (2015).
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Figure 8 shows the unconditional autocorrelation of the aggregate order flow over
time for different values of σ2a˜ and ρ. Although the absolute level of autocorrelation
is low, there is a clear U -shaped pattern of higher order flow autocorrelation at the
beginning and the end of the day (when, from Figure 6, the rebalancer is trading
more) with lower autocorrelation during the middle of the day (when the rebalancer
trades less). Somewhat surprisingly, order flow autocorrelation can be negative in the
middle of the day when the target-information correlation ρ is high.
Figure 8: Plot of E[ynyn+1]√
E[y2n]E[y2n+1]
for n = 1, 2, ..., 9. The parameters are N := 10, σ2w := 4,
σ2v˜ := 1, σ
2
a˜ = 1 (right only), and ρ = 0 (left only).
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Figure 9 shows the unconditional standard deviation for the price changes over
time. Kyle’s model is the solid (blue) line, which is monotonically increasing, whereas
our model produces the U -shaped dotted lines (for various correlation parameters ρ
and target variances σ2a˜). In other words, our model produces equilibrium prices
which are more volatile at the beginning and at the end of the trading day relative
to the middle of the trading day.
The rebalancer’s trading strategy takes into account two types of predictability
in his orders. One part of his orders is predictable to the market makers based on
the prior aggregate order flow. As mentioned after (2.1), the rebalancer’s sunshine
trading component (i.e., the part that is predictable for the market makers) of his
order at time n is (βRn +α
R
n )qn−1. The advantage to the rebalancer of sunshine trading
predictability is that this part of his trades has no price impact (see 1.23).
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Figure 9: Plot of
√
E[(pn − pn−1)2] for n = 1, 2, ..., 10. The parameters are σ2v˜ = 1,
σ2w = 4, N = 10, σ
2
a˜ = 1 (right only), and ρ = 0 (left only).
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σ2a˜ = 1 (− · − · −), σ2a˜ = 3.7 (− · · − · · −). ρ = 0.25 (− · − · −), ρ = 0.47 (− · · − · · −).
Another part of the rebalancer’s orders is predictable to the insider. In particular,
as shown in (1.11), the insider can filter the aggregate order flow better than the
market makers to identify rebalancing orders. The part that is predictable to the
insider is
E[∆θRn |σ(v˜, y1, . . . , yn−1)]
= βRn E[(a˜− θRn−1)|σ(v˜, y1, . . . , yn−1)] + αRn qn−1
= βRn E[(a˜− θRn−1 − qn−1)|σ(v˜ − pn−1)] + (αRn + βRn )qn−1
= βRn
Σ
(3)
n
Σ
(2)
n
(v˜ − pn−1) + (αRn + βRn )qn−1.
(2.2)
Consequently, the part of the rebalancer’s order ∆θRn which is expected by the insider
(and not the market makers) is given by
E[∆θRn |σ(v˜, y1, . . . , yn−1)]− E[∆θRn |σ(y1, . . . , yn−1)] = βRn
Σ
(3)
n
Σ
(2)
n
(v˜ − pn−1). (2.3)
Similarly, the part of the insider’s orders ∆θIn which is expected by the rebalancer
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(and not the market makers) is given by
E[∆θIn|σ(a˜, y1, . . . , yn−1)]− E[∆θIn|σ(y1, . . . , yn−1)] = βIn
Σ
(3)
n
Σ
(1)
n
(a˜− θRn−1 − pn−1). (2.4)
This equality follows from the market makers not expecting the insider to trade at
all.
Figure 10A measures the fraction of the rebalancer’s order at time n which he
expects to trade over time in a way that is predictable for the market maker. We see
that a sunshine component is present but is not particularly large (less than 5% when
σ2a˜ = 1). Figure 10B shows, however, that a portion of the unpredictable part of the
rebalancer’s orders (given the market makers’ information) is predictably offset (given
the rebalancer’s information) by the insider’s trades. This type of predictability is
mutual beneficial for both the rebalancer and the insider. By trading in opposite
directions, they provide symbiotically liquidity to each other with a reduced price
impact. This is evidenced in Figure 11, which shows that the resulting conditional
correlation between the insider’s orders and the rebalancer’s orders is negative later
in the day.
Figure 10: Plot of conditional expectations of the predictable parts of the rebalancer’s
trades (left is the market makers’ estimate and right is the insider’s estimate). These
graphs are independent of (a˜, v˜, w)’s realization. The parameters are σ2v˜ = 1, σ
2
w = 4,
N = 10 and ρ = 0. The variance of the trading target varies: σ2a˜ = 0.48 (−·−·−), σ2a˜ =
1 (−−−), σ2a˜ = 3.7 (———).
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Figure 11: Plot of corr(∆θIn,∆θ
R
n ) for n = 1, 2, ..., 10 (unconditional). The parameters
are σ2v˜ = 1, σ
2
w = 4, N = 10, σ
2
a˜ = 1 (right only), and ρ = 0 (left only).
A: σ2a˜ = 0.48 (− · − · −), σ2a˜ = 1 (−−−), B: ρ = 0 (———), ρ = 0.25 (−−−),
σ2a˜ = 3.7 (———). ρ = 0.47 (− · − · −).
3 Conclusion
This paper has explored the equilibrium interactions between strategic dynamic in-
formed trading, strategic dynamic portfolio rebalancing, price discovery, and liquidity
in a multi–period Kyle (1985) market. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is
the first to investigate these issues with both long-lived information and dynamic
rebalancing given a terminal trading target. We find that uninformed trading has
noteworthy effects on the market equilibrium. Order flow becomes autocorrelated
and liquidity and price discovery dynamics change. We also show that, in equi-
librium, optimal uninformed trading strategies involve learning about the informed
trader’s information and exploiting that information to reduce costs. In addition, we
find that, over time, there is an interesting negative correlation structure between the
informed trader’s and rebalancer’s orders. Because the insider’s and rebalancer’s or-
ders partially cancel each other, they can supply liquidity to each other symbioticallty
with a reduced price impact.
There are many interesting possible extensions for future work. One possible
extension is to model trading in continuous-time. We could also consider other forms
of portfolio rebalancing constraints. A third extension is to relax the assumption
that all investors are risk-neutral. For this extension, it would be natural to consider
exponential utilities with different coefficients of absolute risk aversion. Finally, it
would be interesting to extend the model to include multiple insiders and rebalancers.
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A Proofs
A.1 Kalman filtering
Lemma A.1. Consider the “hat” system (1.14)-(1.18) corresponding to arbitrary
coefficients (βIn, β
R
n , α
R
n )
N
n=1. Whenever (1.25)-(1.28) hold, we have
pˆn = E[v˜|σ(yˆ1, ..., yˆn)], (A.1)
qˆn = E[a˜− θˆRn |σ(yˆ1, ..., yˆn)], (A.2)
where pˆ is defined by (1.17) and qˆ is defined by (1.18). Furthermore, the recursions
for the variances and covariance (1.29)-(1.31) hold.
Proof. For n = 1, ..., N , we have the moment definitions in (1.19)-(1.21) where the
starting values are given in (1.22). We then define the process zˆMn as
zˆMn :=yˆn − (αRn + βRn )qˆn−1
=βIn(v˜ − pˆn−1) + βRn (a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1) + ∆wn.
(A.3)
These Gaussian variables zˆM1 , zˆ
M
2 , ...., zˆ
M
N are mutually independent and satisfy σ(zˆ
M
1 ,
..., zˆMn ) = σ(yˆ1, ...yˆn). The projection theorem for Gaussian random variables pro-
duces
∆pˆn =E[v˜|σ(zˆM1 , ..., zˆMn )]− E[v˜|σ(zˆM1 , ..., zˆn−1)]
=
E[v˜ zˆMn ]
V[zˆMn ]
zˆMn ,
∆qˆn =E[a˜− θˆRn |σ(zˆM1 , ...zˆMn )]− E[a˜− θˆRn−1|σ(zˆM1 , ..., zˆMn−1)]
=E[a˜− θˆRn−1|σ(zˆM1 , ...zˆMn )]− E[a˜− θˆRn−1|σ(zˆM1 , ..., zˆMn−1)]− E[∆θˆRn |σ(zˆM1 , ..., zˆMn )]
=
E[(a˜− θˆRn−1)zˆMn ]
V[zˆMn ]
zˆMn − E
[
βRn (a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1) + (αRn + βRn )qˆn−1
∣∣σ(zˆM1 , ..., zˆMn )]
=
E[(a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1)zˆMn ]
V[zˆMn ]
zˆMn − βRn E[a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1|σ(zˆMn )]− (αRn + βRn )qˆn−1
=(1− βRn )
E[(a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1)zˆMn ]
V[zˆMn ]
zˆMn − (αRn + βRn )qˆn−1.
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To proceed, we first need to compute
V[zˆMn ] =E
[(
βIn(v˜ − pˆn−1) + βRn (a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1) + ∆wn
)2]
=(βIn)
2Σ
(2)
n−1 + (β
R
n )
2Σ
(1)
n−1 + 2β
I
nβ
R
n Σ
(3)
n−1 + σ
2
w∆,
E[v˜zˆMn ] =E[(v˜ − pˆn−1)zˆMn ]
=E
[
(v˜ − pˆn−1)
(
βIn(v˜ − pˆn−1) + βRn (a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1) + ∆wn
)]
=βInΣ
(2)
n−1 + β
R
n Σ
(3)
n−1,
E[(a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1)zˆMn ] =E
[
(a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1)
(
βIn(v˜ − pˆn−1) + βRn (a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1) + ∆wn
)]
=βInΣ
(3)
n−1 + β
R
n Σ
(1)
n−1.
Combining these expressions and by matching coefficients with (1.17) and (1.18), we
find the lemma’s statement equivalent to the restrictions (1.25)-(1.28). Based on
these expressions, the recursion for Σ
(1)
n , n = 1, ..., N , in (1.29) is
Σ(1)n : = V[a˜− θˆRn − qˆn]
= V[a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1 −∆θˆRn −∆qˆn]
= V[a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1 −∆θˆRn − rnyˆn − snqˆn−1]
= V
[
a˜− θˆRn−1 − (1 + sn)qˆn−1 − (1 + rn)(βRn (a˜− θˆRn−1) + αRn qˆn−1)
− rn
(
βIn(v˜ − pˆn−1)
)− rn∆wn],
= V
[(
1− (1 + rn)βRn
)
(a˜− θˆRn−1)−
(
1 + sn + (1 + rn)α
R
n
)
qˆn−1
− rnβIn(v˜ − pˆn−1)− rn∆wn
]
= V
[(
1− (1 + rn)βRn
)
(a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1)− rnβIn(v˜ − pˆn−1)− rn∆wn
]
=
(
1− (1 + rn)βRn
)2
Σ
(1)
n−1 + (rnβ
I
n)
2Σ
(2)
n−1 + r
2
nσ
2
w∆− 2
(
1− (1 + rn)βRn
)
rnβ
I
nΣ
(3)
n−1
= (1− βRn )
(
(1− βRn − rnβRn )Σ(1)n−1 − rnβInΣ(3)n−1
)
,
where the last equality uses (1.26). The recursions for Σ
(2)
n and Σ
(3)
n , n = 1, ..., N , in
(1.30) and (1.31) are found similarly.
♦
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A.2 Insider’s optimization problem
We start with the following lemma which contains most of the calculations we will
need later. We recall the insider’s state processes (X
(1)
n , X
(2)
n ) are defined by (1.33).
Lemma A.2. Fix ∆θRn by (1.5) and let the constants (1.12) and associated terms
(1.51) satisfy the pricing coefficient relations (1.25)-(1.28) and the variances and
covariance recursions (1.29)-(1.31). Let ∆θIn ∈ σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1), n = 1, ..., N , be
arbitrary for the insider. We define the Gaussian random variables
zˆIn :=yˆn −∆θˆIn − (αRn + βRn )qˆn−1 − βRn Σ
(3)
n−1
Σ
(2)
n−1
(v˜ − pˆn−1), n = 1, ..., N. (A.4)
Then zˆIk is independent of (a˜, yˆ1, ...., yˆk−1) for k ≤ N and the following measurability
properties are satisfied:
θˆRn − θRn ∈ σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn) = σ(v˜, yˆ1, ..., yˆn) = σ(v˜, zˆI1 , ...zˆIn), n = 1, ..., N. (A.5)
Furthermore, for n = 1, ..., N , we have the Markovian dynamics
∆X(1)n = −λn
(
∆θIn + β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)
− λnzˆIn, X(1)0 = v˜, (A.6)
∆X(2)n = −rn∆θIn − (1 + rn)βRnX(2)n−1 −
Σ
(3)
n
Σ
(2)
n
λnzˆ
I
n, X
(2)
0 =
ρσa˜
σv˜
v˜. (A.7)
Finally, for any constants I
(1,1)
n , I
(1,2)
n , and I
(2,2)
n , we have the conditional expectation
E
[
(v˜ − pn)∆θIn + I(1,1)n
(
X(1)n
)2
+ I(1,2)n X
(1)
n X
(2)
n + I
(2,2)
n
(
X(2)n
)2 ∣∣∣σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)]
= X
(1)
n−1∆θ
I
n − (∆θIn)2λn −∆θInλnβRnX(2)n−1
+ I(1,1)n
((
X
(1)
n−1
)2
− 2λnX(1)n−1
(
∆θIn + β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)
+ λ2n
(
∆θIn + β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)2
+ λ2nV[zˆIn]
)
+ I(1,2)n
(
X
(1)
n−1X
(2)
n−1 −X(1)n−1
(
rn∆θ
I
n + (1 + rn)β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)
−X(2)n−1λn
(
∆θIn + β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)
(A.8)
+ λn
(
∆θIn + β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)(
rn∆θ
I
n + (1 + rn)β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)
+ λ2n
Σ(3)n
Σ
(2)
n
V[zˆIn]
)
+ I(2,2)n
((
X
(2)
n−1
)2
− 2X(2)n−1
(
rn∆θ
I
n + (1 + rn)β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)
+
(
rn∆θ
I
n + (1 + rn)β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)2
+ λ2n
(
Σ(3)n
Σ
(2)
n
)2
V[zˆIn]
)
,
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which is quadratic in ∆θIn, and where the variance V[zˆIn] can be computed to be
V[zˆIn] = (βRn )2
(
Σ
(1)
n−1 −
(
Σ
(3)
n−1
)2
Σ
(2)
n−1
)
+ σ2w∆. (A.9)
Proof. The joint normality claim follows by an induction argument. To see the inde-
pendence claim we start by noticing
βRn
(
a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1 − E
[
a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1|σ(v˜, yˆ1, ..., yˆn−1)
] )
+ ∆wn
= βRn
(
a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1 − Σ
(3)
n−1
Σ
(3)
n−1
(v˜ − pˆn−1)
)
+ αRn qˆn−1 − αRn qˆn−1 + ∆wn
= yˆn −∆θˆIn − (αRn + βRn )qˆn−1 − βRn Σ
(3)
n−1
Σ
(3)
n−1
(
v˜ − pˆn−1
)
,
which is zˆIn (see A.4). To see the independence of the random variables (A.4) we let
k ≤ n− 1 be arbitrary. Iterated expectations produce the zero correlation property:
E[yˆkzˆIn] = E[E[yˆkzˆIn|σ(a˜, yˆ1, ..., yˆk)]] = E[yˆkE[zˆIn|σ(a˜, yˆ1, ..., yˆk)]] = 0.
The independence then follows from the joint normality.
Next, we observe that the last equality in (A.5) follows directly from (A.4). We
proceed by induction and observe
σ(v˜, y1) = σ(v˜, β
R
1 a˜+ ∆w1) = σ(v˜, yˆ1),
θˆR1 − θR1 = 0,
which follows from θˆI1, θ
I
1 ∈ σ(v˜). Suppose that (A.5) holds for n. Then,
θˆRn+1 − θRn+1 = (1− βRn+1)(θˆRn − θRn ) + αRn+1(qˆn − qn) ∈ σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn),
σ(v˜, yˆ1, ..., yˆn+1) = σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn, yˆn+1)
= σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn, yn+1 + ∆θˆ
I
n+1 −∆θIn+1 + ∆θˆRn+1 −∆θRn+1)
= σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn+1),
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which proves (A.5). The dynamics (A.6) can be seen as follows
∆X(1)n = −∆pn
= −λn
(
∆θIn + β
R
n (a˜− θRn−1) + αRn qn−1 + ∆wn
)
− µnqn−1
= −λn
(
∆θIn + β
R
n (a˜− θRn−1) + αRn qn−1 + yˆn −∆θˆIn −∆θˆRn
)
+ λn(α
R
n + β
R
n )qn−1
= −λn
(
∆θIn + β
R
n (θˆ
R
n−1 − θRn−1) + zˆIn + βRn (qˆn−1 − qn−1) + βRn Σ
(3)
n−1
Σ
(2)
n−1
(
v˜ − pˆn−1
))
= −λn
(
∆θIn + β
R
nX
(2)
n−1 + zˆ
I
n
)
,
The dynamics (A.7) are found similarly using expressions (1.25)-(1.26) and (1.30)-
(1.31).
The expression for the variance (A.9) is found as follows:
V[zˆIn] = V
[
βRn
(
a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1 − E
[
a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1|σ(v˜, yˆ1, ..., yˆn−1)
] )
+ ∆wn
]
= V
[
βRn
(
a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1 − Σ
(3)
n−1
Σ
(2)
n−1
(v˜ − pˆn−1)
)]
+ σ2w∆
= (βRn )
2
(
Σ
(1)
n−1 −
(
Σ
(3)
n−1
)2
Σ
(2)
n−1
)
+ σ2w∆.
To compute the conditional expectation (A.8), we compute the four individual
terms. The first term in (A.8) equals
E[(v˜ − pn)∆θIn|σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)]
= (v˜ − pn−1)∆θIn −∆θInE[∆pn|σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)]
= X
(1)
n−1∆θ
I
n −∆θInλnE[∆θIn + βRn (a˜− θRn−1 − qn−1)|σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)]
= X
(1)
n−1∆θ
I
n − (∆θIn)2λn
−∆θInλnβRn
(
θˆRn−1 − θRn−1 + qˆn−1 − qn−1 + E[a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1|σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)]
)
= X
(1)
n−1∆θ
I
n − (∆θIn)2λn −∆θInλnβRn
(
θˆRn−1 − θRn−1 + qˆn−1 − qn−1 +
Σ
(3)
n−1
Σ
(2)
n−1
(v˜ − pˆn−1)
)
= X
(1)
n−1∆θ
I
n − (∆θIn)2λn −∆θInλnβRnX(2)n−1.
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The second term in (A.8) is
E[
(
X(1)n
)2 |σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)]
=
(
X
(1)
n−1
)2
+ 2X
(1)
n−1E[∆X(1)n |σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)] + E[
(
∆X(1)n
)2 |σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)]
=
(
X
(1)
n−1
)2
− 2λnX(1)n−1
(
∆θIn + β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)
+ λ2n
(
∆θIn + β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)2
+ λ2nV[zˆIn].
The third term in (A.8) is
E[X(1)n X(2)n |σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)]
= X
(1)
n−1X
(2)
n−1 +X
(1)
n−1E[∆X(2)n |σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)] +X(2)n−1E[∆X(1)n |σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)]
+ E[∆X(1)n ∆X(2)n |σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)]
= X
(1)
n−1X
(2)
n−1 −X(1)n−1
(
rn∆θ
I
n + (1 + rn)β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)
−X(2)n−1λn
(
∆θIn + β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)
+ λn
(
∆θIn + β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)(
rn∆θ
I
n + (1 + rn)β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)
+ λ2n
Σ
(3)
n
Σ
(2)
n
V[zˆIn].
Finally, the last term in (A.8) is
E[
(
X(2)n
)2 |σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)]
=
(
X
(2)
n−1
)2
+ 2X
(2)
n−1E[∆X(2)n |σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)] + E[
(
∆X(2)n
)2 |σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)]
=
(
X
(2)
n−1
)2
− 2X(2)n−1
(
rn∆θ
I
n + (1 + rn)β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)
+
(
rn∆θ
I
n + (1 + rn)β
R
nX
(2)
n−1
)2
+ λ2n
(
Σ
(3)
n
Σ
(2)
n
)2
V[zˆIn].
♦
Theorem A.3. Fix ∆θRn by (1.5) and let the constants (1.12) and associate terms
(1.51) satisfy the pricing coefficient relations (1.25)-(1.28), the variances and covari-
ance recursions (1.29)-(1.31), the value function coefficient recursions (B.1)-(B.3) and
the second-order-condition (1.39). Then the insider’s value function has the quadratic
form (1.35) where X
(1)
n and X
(2)
n are defined in (1.33) and ∆pn is defined by (1.7).
Furthermore, the insider’s optimal trading strategy is given by (1.36).
Proof. We prove the theorem by the backward induction. Suppose that (1.35) holds
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for n+ 1. The insider’s value function in the n’th iteration then becomes
max
∆θI
k
∈σ(v˜,y1,...,yk−1)
n≤k≤N
E
[ N∑
k=n
(v˜ − pk)∆θIk
∣∣∣σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)]
= max
∆θIn∈σ(v˜,y1,...,yn−1)
E
[
(v˜ − pn)∆θIn + I(0)n +
∑
1≤i≤j≤2
I(i,j)n X
(i)
n X
(j)
n
∣∣∣σ(v˜, y1, ..., yn−1)].
(A.10)
Because (1.39) holds, Lemma A.2 shows that the coefficient in front of (∆θRn )
2 appear-
ing in (A.10) is strictly negative. Consequently, the first-order condition is sufficient
for optimality and the maximizer is (1.36). The value function coefficient recursions
(B.1)-(B.3) are obtained by inserting the optimizer (1.36) into (A.10).
♦
A.3 Rebalancer’s optimization problem
In the following analogue of Lemma A.2 we recall that the rebalancer’s state variables
(Y
(1)
n , Y
(2)
n , Y
(3)
n ) are defined in (1.42).
Lemma A.4. We define ∆θIn by (1.6) and let the constants (1.12) and associate
terms (1.51) satisfy the pricing coefficient relations (1.25)-(1.28) and the variances
and covariance recursions (1.29)-(1.31). Let ∆θRn ∈ σ(a˜, y1, ..., yn−1), n = 1, ..., N be
arbitrary for the rebalancer. We define the Gaussian random variables
zˆRn := yˆn −∆θˆRn − βInΣ
(3)
n−1
Σ
(1)
n−1
(a˜− θˆRn−1 − qˆn−1), n = 1, ..., N. (A.11)
Then zˆRk is independent of (v˜, yˆ1, ...., yˆk−1) for k ≤ N and the following measurability
properties are satisfied
σ(a˜, y1, ..., yk) = σ(a˜, yˆ1, ..., yˆk) = σ(a˜, zˆ
R
1 , ..., zˆ
R
k ). (A.12)
Furthermore, for n = 1, ..., N , we have the Markovian dynamics
∆Y (2)n = −λn
(
∆θRn + β
I
nY
(2)
n−1 − (αRn + βRn )Y (3)n−1
)
− rnΣ
(3)
n
Σ
(1)
n
zˆRn , Y
(2)
0 =
σv˜ρ
σa˜
a˜, (A.13)
∆Y (3)n = rn
(
∆θRn + β
I
nY
(2)
n−1
)
− (1 + rn)(αRn + βRn )Y (3)n−1 + rnzˆRn , Y (3)0 = 0. (A.14)
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For constants L
(1,1)
n , L
(1,2)
n , L
(1,3)
n , L
(2,2)
n , L
(2,3)
n , and L
(3,3)
n we have the conditional ex-
pectation
E[−(a˜− θRn−1)∆pn +
∑
1≤i≤j≤3
L(i,j)n Y
(i)
n Y
(j)
n |σ(a˜, y1, ..., yn−1)]
= −Y (1)n−1
(
λn(∆θ
R
n + β
I
nY
(2)
n−1) + µnY
(3)
n−1
)
+ L(1,1)n
(
(Y
(1)
n−1 −∆θRn )2
)
+ L(1,2)n (Y
(1)
n−1 −∆θRn )
(
Y
(2)
n−1 − λn
(
∆θRn + β
I
nY
(2)
n−1 − (αRn + βRn )Y (3)n−1
))
+ L(1,3)n (Y
(1)
n−1 −∆θRn )
(
Y
(3)
n−1 + rn
(
∆θRn + β
I
nY
(2)
n−1
)− (1 + rn)(αRn + βRn )Y (3)n−1)
+ L(2,2)n
(
(Y
(2)
n−1)
2 − 2Y (2)n−1λn
(
∆θRn + β
I
nY
(2)
n−1 − (αRn + βRn )Y (3)n−1
)
+ λ2n
(
∆θRn + β
I
nY
(2)
n−1 − (αRn + βRn )Y (3)n−1
)2
+ r2n
(
Σ(3)n
Σ
(1)
n
)2
V[zˆRn ]
)
(A.15)
+ L(2,3)n
(
Y
(2)
n−1Y
(3)
n−1 + Y
(2)
n−1
(
rn
(
∆θRn + β
I
nY
(2)
n−1
)− (1 + rn)(αRn + βRn )Y (3)n−1)
− Y (3)n−1λn
(
∆θRn + β
I
nY
(2)
n−1 − (αRn + βRn )Y (3)n−1
)
− r2nΣ
(3)
n
Σ
(1)
n
V[zˆRn ]
− λn
(
∆θRn + β
I
nY
(2)
n−1 − (αRn + βRn )Y (3)n−1
)(
rn
(
∆θRn + β
I
nY
(2)
n−1
)− (1 + rn)(αRn + βRn )Y (3)n−1))
+ L(3,3)n
(
(Y
(3)
n−1)
2 + 2Y
(3)
n−1
(
rn
(
∆θRn + β
I
nY
(2)
n−1
)− (1 + rn)(αRn + βRn )Y (3)n−1)
+
(
rn
(
∆θRn + β
I
nY
(2)
n−1
)− (1 + rn)(αRn + βRn )Y (3)n−1)2 + r2nV[zˆRn ]),
which is quadratic in ∆θRn , and where the variance V[zˆRn ] is given by
V[zˆRn ] = (βIn)2
(
Σ
(2)
n−1 −
(
Σ
(3)
n−1
)2
Σ
(1)
n−1
)
+ σ2w∆. (A.16)
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma A.2 and is therefore omitted.
♦
Theorem A.5. Fix ∆θIn by (1.6) and let the constants (1.12) and associated terms
(1.51) satisfy the pricing coefficient relations (1.25)-(1.28), the variances and covari-
ance recursions (1.29)-(1.31), the value function coefficient recursions (B.4)-(B.9)
and the second-order-condition (1.49). Then for n = 0, 1, ..., N − 1 the rebalancer’s
value function has the quadratic form (1.44) where (Y
(1)
n , Y
(3)
n , Y
(3)
n ) are defined by
(1.42) and ∆pn is defined by (1.7). Furthermore, the rebalancer’s optimal trading
strategy is given by (1.45).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem A.3 and is therefore omitted.
♦
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A.4 Remaining proof
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Part (iii) of Definition 1.1 holds from Lemma A.1. Parts (i)-
(ii) of Definition 1.1 hold from Theorem A.3 and Theorem A.5 as soon as we show
that the optimizers (1.36) and (1.45) agree with (1.14) and (1.15). This, however,
follows from the equilibrium conditions (1.40) and (1.50).
♦
B Value function coefficients
The recursion for the insider’s value function coefficients is given by
I
(1,1)
n−1 =
−1 + rn(2I(1,2)n − (I(1,2)n )2rn + 4I(1,1)n I(2,2)n rn)
4(I
(2,2)
n r2n + λn(−1 + I(1,2)n rn + I(1,1)n λn))
, (B.1)
I
(1,2)
n−1 = −
(−1 + I(1,2)n rn)(I(1,2)n (−1 + βRn ) + βRn )λn + 2I(2,2)n rn(−1 + βRn + rnβRn − 2I(1,1)n (−1 + βRn )λn)
2(I
(2,2)
n r2n + λn(−1 + I(1,2)n rn + I(1,1)n λn))
,
(B.2)
I
(2,2)
n−1 = λn
−(I(1,2)n (−1 + βRn ) + βRn )2λn − 4I(2,2)n (−1 + βRn )(−1 + I(1,1)n λn + βRn (1 + rn − I(1,1)n λn))
4(I
(2,2)
n r2n + λn(−1 + I(1,2)n rn + I(1,1)n λn))
.
(B.3)
The recursion for the rebalancer’s value function coefficients is given by
L
(1,1)
n−1 = −
(
(L(1,3)n )
2r2n − 2(1 + L(1,2)n )L(1,3)n rnλn + (1 + L(1,2)n )2λ2n
+ 4L(1,1)n (−L(3,3)n r2n + λn + L(2,3)n rnλn − L(2,2)n λ2n)
)/
4
(
L(1,1)n − L(1,3)n rn + L(3,3)n r2n + λn(L(1,2)n − L(2,3)n rn + L(2,2)n λn)
)
,
(B.4)
L
(1,2)
n−1 = −
(
(L(1,3)n rn − λn)(L(2,3)n rn + L(1,3)n rnβIn − 2L(2,2)n λn) + (L(1,2)n )2λn(−1 + βInλn)
+ L(1,2)n (rn(L
(1,3)
n − 2L(3,3)n rn) + λn + rn(L(2,3)n − 2L(1,3)n βIn)λn + βInλ2n)
+ 2L(1,1)n (−rn(L(2,3)n + 2L(3,3)n rnβIn) + (2L(2,2)n + βIn + 2L(2,3)n rnβIn)λn
− 2L(2,2)n βInλ2n)
)/
2
(
L(1,1)n − L(1,3)n rn + L(3,3)n r2n + λn(L(1,2)n − L(2,3)n rn + L(2,2)n λn)
)
,
(B.5)
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L
(1,3)
n−1 =
[
(L(1,3)n )
2rn(−1 + αRn + rnαRn + βRn + rnβRn )
+ (1 + L(1,2)n )λn
(
− 2L(3,3)n rn(−1 + αRn + βRn )− L(2,3)n λn
+ (L(1,2)n + L
(2,3)
n )(α
R
n + β
R
n )λn
)
+ 2L(1,1)n
(− 2L(3,3)n rn(−1 + αRn + rnαRn + βRn + rnβRn )
− L(2,3)n λn + (αRn + βRn )λn(1 + L(2,3)n + 2L(2,3)n rn − 2L(2,2)n λn)
)
(B.6)
+ L(1,3)n λn
(
− 1 + αRn + βRn + L(2,3)n rn(−1 + αRn + βRn )
− L(1,2)n (−1 + αRn + 2rnαRn + βRn + 2rnβRn ) + 2L(2,2)n λn − (αRn + βRn )(rn + 2L(2,2)n λn)
)]/
2(L(1,1)n − L(1,3)n rn + L(3,3)n r2n + λn(L(1,2)n − L(2,3)n rn + L(2,2)n λn)),
L
(2,2)
n−1 = −
[
(L(1,2)n )
2(−1 + βInλn)2 − 2L(1,2)n rn
(
L(2,3)n − L(2,3)n βInλn
+ βIn(−L(1,3)n + 2L(3,3)n rn + L(1,3)n βInλn)
)
+ rn
((
(L(2,3)n )
2 − 4L(2,2)n L(3,3)n
)
rn
+ (L(1,3)n )
2rn(β
I
n)
2 + L(1,3)n (4L
(2,2)
n + 2L
(2,3)
n rnβ
I
n − 4L(2,2)n βInλn)
)
− 4L(1,1)n
(
L(2,2)n (−1 + βInλn)2 + rnβIn(L(2,3)n + L(3,3)n rnβIn − L(2,3)n βInλn)
)]/
4(L(1,1)n − L(1,3)n rn + L(3,3)n r2n + λn(L(1,2)n − L(2,3)n rn + L(2,2)n λn)),
(B.7)
L
(2,3)
n−1 =
[(
L(1,3)n rn(L
(2,3)
n + L
(1,3)
n β
I
n)− 2L(1,1)n (L(2,3)n + 2L(3,3)n rnβIn)
)
(−1 + αRn + rnαRn + βRn + rnβRn )
+
(
(L(2,3)n )
2rn(−1 + αRn + βRn ) + 2L(1,1)n L(2,3)n βIn(−1 + αRn + 2rnαRn + βRn + 2rnβRn )
+ 4L(2,2)n (−L(3,3)n rn(−1 + αRn + βRn ) + L(1,1)n (αRn + βRn ))
+ L(1,3)n (L
(2,3)
n rnβ
I
n(−1 + αRn + βRn )− 2L(2,2)n (1 + (−1 + rn)αRn + (−1 + rn)βRn ))
)
λn
− 2L(2,2)n βIn(L(1,3)n (−1 + αRn + βRn ) + 2L(1,1)n (αRn + βRn ))λ2n
+ (L(1,2)n )
2(αRn + β
R
n )λn(−1 + βInλn) + L(1,2)n (L(2,3)n λn (B.8)
− 2L(3,3)n rn(−1 + αRn + rnαRn + βRn + rnβRn + βIn(−1 + αRn + βRn )λn)
+ L(2,3)n λn((−1 + rn)(αRn + βRn ) + βIn(−1 + αRn + βRn )λn)
+ L(1,3)n (−1 + αRn + rnαRn + βRn + rnβRn + βInλn − (1 + 2rn)βIn(αRn + βRn )λn))
]/
2
(
L(1,1)n − L(1,3)n rn + L(3,3)n r2n + λn(L(1,2)n − L(2,3)n rn + L(2,2)n λn)
)
,
L
(3,3)
n−1 = −
[
(L(1,3)n )
2(−1 + αRn + rnαRn + βRn + rnβRn )2 + 2L(1,3)n λn
(
(−1 + αRn + rnαRn + βRn + rnβRn )×(
L(2,3)n (−1 + αRn + βRn )− L(1,2)n (αRn + βRn )
)− 2L(2,2)n (−1 + αRn + βRn )(αRn + βRn ) λn)
− 4L(1,1)n
(
L(3,3)n (−1 + αRn + rnαRn + βRn + rnβRn )2 + (αRn + βRn )λn×(− L(2,3)n (−1 + αRn + rnαRn + βRn + rnβRn ) + L(2,2)n (αRn + βRn )λn)) (B.9)
+ λn
((
(L(2,3)n )
2 − 4L(2,2)n L(3,3)n
)
(−1 + αRn + βRn )2λn + (L(1,2)n )2(αRn + βRn )2λn
− 2L(1,2)n (−1 + αRn + βRn )(2L(3,3)n (−1 + αRn + rnαRn + βRn + rnβRn )− L(2,3)n (αRn + βRn )λn)
)]/
4
(
L(1,1)n − L(1,3)n rn + L(3,3)n r2n + λn(L(1,2)n − L(2,3)n rn + L(2,2)n λn)
)
.
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